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T
here have been signiﬁ  cant 
increases in development 
ﬁ  nance since 2000, particularly 
for health [1,2]. As country programs 
put this money to work, important 
lessons and challenges on how to make 
health ﬁ  nance more effective emerge.
Performance-based funding provides 
clear incentives to achieve results 
and has been used by organizations 
such as the Global Fund to Fight 
AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (the 
Global Fund) [3,4]. However, there 
are concerns that performance-
based funding may penalize poorer 
countries and may not be ﬂ  exible 
enough to contribute to health systems 
generally. Such concerns provoke 
two important questions: How are 
programs performing in countries at 
different levels of development, health 
systems strength, and disease burden? 
And what are the wider challenges 
of implementing performance-
based funding to use health ﬁ  nances 
effectively, strengthen health 
systems, and achieve the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs)?
Performance-Based Funding in 
Action: The Global Fund
To give an example, the Global Fund 
has disbursed US$3.24 billion to 
programs to ﬁ  ght HIV, tuberculosis 
(TB), and malaria in 130 countries 
and uses performance-based funding 
to evaluate program performance 
and manage grants. Funding is not 
guaranteed but is released based on 
demonstrated results against agreed 
country-owned targets and indicators 
that are set out in the initial grant 
agreement.
Supporting Information File S1 
provides an extensive analysis of the 
results of 370 active grants to ﬁ  ght 
AIDS, TB, and malaria in 130 countries 
by programmatic service delivered, 
region, type of recipient, and country 
characteristics. Supporting Information 
File S2 gives a table of key data on 
grants reviewed with their ratings, 
principal recipient characteristics, 
disease component, and ﬁ  nancial 
information. The analysis shown in File 
S1 assesses whether performance-based 
funding penalized poorer countries 
or those with weaker health systems. 
The results show the rapid scale-up of 
services to people in need, doubling 
each year, with ﬁ  nanced programs 
providing 1.1 million people with HIV 
treatment, 2.8 million people with TB 
treatment, and 30 million people with 
insecticide-treated bednets (ITNs) to 
protect families from malaria.
Most importantly,75% of country 
programs reached their targets and 
were able to make the money work 
to deliver AIDS, TB, or malaria 
services. Of the remaining country 
programs, 21% had inadequate 
results but displayed the potential to 
accelerate implementation and achieve 
targets in the future, and 4% showed 
unacceptable results. Sub-Saharan 
Africa did not show substantially worse 
performance than other regions. The 
poorest third of countries performed 
no worse, indicating that performance-
based funding works if targets are set 
and owned by the countries and set 
according to the country situation.
The analysis concludes that 
performance-based funding provides 
powerful incentives to scale up the ﬁ  ght 
against these three diseases by linking 
ﬁ  nance to the delivery of services. It is 
essential that targets are set and owned 
by countries rather than international 
funders, so that poorer countries, 
fragile states, and countries with weaker 
health systems are not penalized. But 
there are many challenges to successful 
performance-based funding, including 
how we ensure ﬂ  exible “diagonal” 
funding so that “vertical” disease-speciﬁ  c 
initiatives on AIDS, TB, and malaria can 
also support general health systems.
What Is Performance-Based 
Funding?
Driven by a commitment to ensure that 
health ﬁ  nance is effective, incentives 
are increasingly being used to focus 
on outcomes, identify problems, 
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 Figure 1. Variability in Performance of 215 
Grants Evaluated by December 1, 2006
A: met or exceeded performance. B1: 
adequate performance. B2: inadequate 
performance but demonstrated potential. C: 
unacceptable performance.
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reward solutions, and manage results 
[1–4]. Performance-based funding 
was developed in the 1970s in the 
education sector, and is used by 
a number of recent development 
initiatives, including the GAVI Alliance 
(formerly known as the Global Alliance 
for Vaccines and Immunisation), the 
Millennium Challenge Account (see 
http:⁄⁄www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/
developingnations/millennium.html), 
and the European Commission, as well 
as more general health initiatives [3–6].
The Global Fund uses performance-
based funding to disburse all funds, 
which are released incrementally 
based on demonstrated results against 
targets, and fund recipients must 
provide an explanation of deviations, 
what has worked, and what can be 
improved. Explicit performance ratings 
are made for each grant and used as 
a basis for decisions, including: (1) 
stopping grants (which has occurred 
in Nigeria, South Africa, Senegal, and 
Pakistan); (2) reducing funding (the 
Kenya malaria program had US$5.8 
million reduced commensurate with 
delays of one year); or (3) accelerating 
funding (the Ethiopia malaria grant 
had its year 4 budget accelerated into 
year 3 to double the number of ITNs 
distributed to families [Box 1]). Funds 
are geared to the speed and efﬁ  ciency 
of implementation, not to a ﬁ  xed 
calendar. If grant implementation is 
slower than planned, funds not used 
can be reallocated to other grants, 
and technical assistance needs can be 
addressed. If implementation is faster, 
funds can be accelerated.
Importantly, performance-
based funding is based on radical 
country ownership of targets and 
implementation, with limited 
interference by the Global Fund as 
the donor. Implementation plans 
and targets are proposed by countries 
(with no formal involvement of 
the Global Fund), agreed upon 
by representatives of government, 
civil society, and people affected by 
the diseases in country (as part of a 
country coordinating mechanism), and 
reviewed by an international technical 
review panel. Performance is measured 
against what is realistic to achieve in 
country in a speciﬁ  c timescale. Russia 
is not, for example, pitted against 
Zambia, nor India against Swaziland. 
Country ownership and performance-
based funding aim to strengthen 
basic country management. As the 
manager of the Guatemala programs 
commented, “If sub-recipients see 
their results falling into the red, they 
telephone us and we talk it through 
and ﬁ  nd solutions. Equally important 
we feed back…our performance and 
we have a mature debate, not just 
on politics but implementation and 
progress, real grant issues” [5].
Can Countries Make the 
Money Work?
There is considerable inherent 
variation and risk in the performance 
of ﬁ  nanced programs for HIV, TB, and 
malaria. We often expect ﬁ  nance to 
“buy” results (as with the MDGs, which 
are costed at US$189 billion until 
2015 [7]), and yet risks and returns 
are often not revealed until programs 
are implemented. In the Global Fund 
analysis (File S1), programs showing 
excellent performance achieved 
120% of their initial targets for the 
main interventions, compared to 
60% for programs with inadequate 
performance. Basing ﬁ  nance and 
technical assistance on differences 
in performance has the potential to 
accelerate implementation and double 
the results from health ﬁ  nance.
Figure 1 shows that 75% of programs 
demonstrated satisfactory to excellent 
performance, 21% inadequate 
performance, and 4% unacceptable 
performance. The most difﬁ  cult 
investment decisions were in the 21% 
of programs performing inadequately, 
due to the difﬁ  cult trade-offs between 
poor performance against current 
targets and demonstrated potential 
to accelerate implementation. Taken 
together, the 215 programs evaluated 
for their ﬁ  rst 18-month phase of 
implementation achieved 94% of 
their programmatic targets (Figure 2). 
Some of the programs fell below their 
individual targets, but well-performing 
programs allowed the Global Fund to 
achieve its results overall. Such well-
performing programs allow the Global 
Fund to absorb a certain level of risk 
(for example, in poor performance of 
early investments in Nigeria, Uganda, 
and Kenya) and still achieve positive 
results overall. There were areas of 
weakness—for example, delays in the 
early stages of malaria interventions 
occurred because a few large grants 
in Ethiopia, Kenya, and Tanzania 
were not used quickly enough to 
distribute ITNs. But the example in 
Box 1 shows that a grant that is slow 
to get started can catch up rapidly 
once initial problems are solved and 
investments in capacity are made. The 
analysis also found that prevention 
of mother-to-child HIV transmission 
was underperforming more generally 
across many grants, and gender 
issues urgently need to be addressed 
to ensure that women are reached 
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.0040219.g002
 Figure 2. Variability in Programmatic Performance in Major Service Areas for HIV/AIDS, TB, 
Malaria, and Cross-Cutting Care, Support, and Training
ARV, antiretroviral; DOTS, directly observed treatment, short-course; LLN, long-lasting net; MDR-TB, 
multidrug-resistant tuberculosis; PMTCT, prevention of mother-to-child transmission. PLoS Medicine  |  www.plosmedicine.org 1310 August 2007  |  Volume 4  |  Issue 8  |  e219
with what is essentially an affordable 
“vaccine” to prevent the infection of 
children. Despite many challenges, the 
majority of country programs can make 
the money work.
Learning from Performance: 
Intelligent Implementation
Performance-based funding 
brings many of the challenges of 
implementation to the surface, allowing 
countries and partners to respond 
to them in a transparent manner, 
and promoting necessary “learning 
by doing.” There are several general 
lessons from program performance 
across the three diseases.
The analysis in File S1 showed that 
civil society was a particularly strong 
implementer (83% of civil society–
implemented programs performed 
strongly), alongside its acknowledged 
role in governance and oversight. TB 
programs also performed particularly 
well (84% performed strongly), 
probably as a result of the important 
support of the Stop TB Partnership in 
coordinating partner roles clearly and 
providing a full package of managerial 
as well as technical assistance. 
Such partner support and formal 
coordination has clear lessons for 
HIV and malaria programs. Technical 
support was most needed when 
countries were scaling up services and 
showing results, as for example when 
the Malawi and Ethiopia programs 
extended successful services to rural 
areas. Such support is not just needed 
when problems arise. The greatest 
potential returns for technical support 
came from a general package to help 
adequately performing programs (as 
well as problem programs), which 
by our estimations can increase 
results in sub-Saharan Africa by 
90% if effective. As mentioned, the 
poorest third of countries did not 
have worse performance ratings than 
wealthier countries. Only 9% of funds 
have been reallocated from these 
poorest countries due to inadequate 
performance, a third less than the 
funds removed from all grants. 
Performance-based funding can be 
an investment in performance and in 
reducing poverty.
Conclusion: “Diagonal Financing” 
Can Support Health Systems
Despite many challenges, performance-
based funding provides powerful 
incentives to scale up the ﬁ  ght against 
HIV, TB, and malaria. It also has more 
general implications for the delivery 
of development and health ﬁ  nance. At 
its best, performance-based funding 
combines the inventiveness of country 
solutions with the sharp focus and 
incentives of performance, ensuring 
people receive services with urgency. 
Most country programs have been 
able to make the money work, in poor 
countries and fragile states, across the 
three diseases and with civil society and 
government implementers. However, 
there is considerable inherent risk in 
the results we can expect from health 
programs and ﬁ  nance. The variability 
in returns in health programs (well-
performing programs return twice 
the results) is not always recognized 
and needs to be actively managed 
with ﬁ  nancial incentives and technical 
support.
A major question is whether funding 
for speciﬁ  c diseases like AIDS, TB, 
and malaria (“vertical ﬁ  nancing”) 
has positive or negative effects on 
more general or “horizontal” health 
systems. The Global Fund provides 
“diagonal ﬁ  nancing,” with a sharp 
focus on achieving disease goals while 
allowing ﬁ  nance to more broadly 
strengthen the supporting health 
sector. As health programs keep scaling 
up, the major gap in health systems 
strengthening is increasingly obvious. 
Such strengthening requires dedicated 
ﬁ  nances and increasing ﬂ  exibility in 
disease-speciﬁ  c ﬁ  nancing to ﬁ  ll key 
gaps in capacity. Due to the ﬂ  exibility 
of Global Fund ﬁ  nancing in supporting 
services and systems, countries with 
weaker health systems or human 
resources for health did not perform 
signiﬁ  cantly worse (25% and 26% 
poor-performing compared to 25% 
for all grants). Global Fund ﬁ  nance 
can be delivered “vertically” to AIDS, 
TB, and malaria control programs 
or “horizontally” through pooled or 
sector-wide approach funding (for 
example in Ghana or Mozambique). 
Many effective programs have used 
Global Funds “diagonally” to effectively 
ﬁ  nance AIDS, TB, and malaria 
services, while building the necessary 
In June 2005, the Ministry of Health 
of Ethiopia had not yet delivered a 
single grant-supported ITN despite 
a target of two million ITNs to be 
delivered by this date. This lack of 
delivery was largely due to procurement 
bottlenecks and global supply-side 
problems, for both long-lasting ITNs 
and artemisinin-based combination 
therapy for malaria. The Global 
Fund placed very strict conditions on 
continued funding: funding would 
be discontinued if the ITNs were not 
delivered before the next malaria 
season.
The urgency of the conditions 
provided clear incentives for the 
country to come up with innovative 
solutions. Ethiopia requested technical 
support from UNICEF, increased 
their procurement ofﬁ  ce capacity, 
and invested to remove delays in the 
national supply chain. As a result, 
two million long-lasting ITNs were 
distributed within four months before 
the onset of the malaria season. The 
Ministry of Heath also was able to 
train 4,416 health workers on ITN use, 
train 5,222 health workers on malaria 
diagnosis and treatment, and deliver 
2 million doses of artemisinin-based 
combination therapy.
Given this accelerated performance, 
the Ministry of Heath now intends 
to deliver an additional 7 million 
ITNs in line with achievement of 
the Abuja targets on malaria control 
(see http:⁄⁄www.rbm.who.int/docs/
abuja_declaration_ﬁ  nal.htm) and the 
MDGs. Given Ethiopia’s current level 
of performance, the budget for year 4 
has been accelerated into year 3. This 
is a good example of a malaria grant 
that can be slow to get started but 
catch up rapidly once initial problems 
are solved. The Ethiopian Minister of 
Health commented on the incentives 
of performance-based funding: “What 
made the difference is you gave us 
a clear warning, that we were in the 
red zone…we could lose our money 
if we didn’t deliver results. We looked 
at it, we could focus and we both 
saw the problem…and that was the 
adjustment we made to get the results. 
Performance-based funding helped us 
think through implementation” [5].
Box 1: A Country Example of Performance-Based Funding: The 
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supporting systems, including human 
resources.
On the ground, ﬂ  exible ﬁ  nance 
is critical. When AIDS and malaria 
programs extended their services to 
rural areas of Ethiopia, they found 
that 30,000 community health workers 
needed training and community health 
posts needed refurbishing, which the 
Global Fund was able to support. In 
Haiti, a 14-month study showed that 
the Global Fund HIV program resulted 
in increased vaccinations, prenatal 
care, family planning, and ﬂ  ow of 
essential medicines, improving staff 
morale and health center capacity 
[8]. However, many programs do not 
use Global Fund ﬁ  nance as ﬂ  exibly 
and effectively, and we need to “mind 
the gap” ﬁ  nancially in health systems. 
Reaching the MDGs will require 
US$67 billion for human resources 
for health [7]. Other donors are 
urgently required, particularly for 
ﬁ  nancing long-term, systematic health 
infrastructure [9]. If the MDGs are to 
be achieved, signiﬁ  cant increases in 
ﬁ  nance and innovative mechanisms 
will be required to ensure that funds 
are delivered effectively. Performance-
based funding may be one important 
mechanism to provide focus, 
incentives, and risk management in 
AIDS, TB, malaria, and health systems 
ﬁ  nancing.  
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